I. Leibniz's Mill I. Leibniz's Mill Argument Argument
In In Monadology Monadology, Leibniz advances a , Leibniz advances a ll ll k tf t h i k tf t h i well well--known argument for the view known argument for the view "that perception and that which "that perception and that which depends upon it are inexplicable on depends upon it are inexplicable on mechanical grounds, that is to say, mechanical grounds, that is to say, by means of figures and motions." by means of figures and motions." He invites us to imagine "a machine, so He invites us to imagine "a machine, so He invites us to imagine a machine, so He invites us to imagine a machine, so constructed as to think, feel, and have constructed as to think, feel, and have perception, … [but] increased in size, perception, … [but] increased in size, while keeping the same proportions, so while keeping the same proportions, so that one might go into it as into a mill" that one might go into it as into a mill" ( (Monadalogy Monadalogy § §17) 17). . December 12, 2008 December 12, 2008 Don't Mind the Gap Don't Mind the Gap 3 3
Leibniz argues that "we should, Leibniz argues that "we should, on examining [the] interior [of this on examining [the] interior [of this machine], find only parts which work machine], find only parts which work one upon another, and never anything one upon another, and never anything by which to explain a perception." by which to explain a perception." by which to explain a perception. by which to explain a perception. He concludes that this shows that He concludes that this shows that perceiving can occur only in perceiving can occur only in "a simple substance, and not in "a simple substance, and not in a compound or in a machine." a compound or in a machine." Descartes had argued
Descartes had argued (M6) (M6) from from the the
Descartes had argued
Descartes had argued (M6) (M6) from from the the unity of consciousness unity of consciousness that a thinking that a thinking substance must be indivisible; substance must be indivisible; Leibniz uses his
Leibniz uses his Mill Argument
Mill Argument in part to in part to reach a similar conclusion for perceiving. reach a similar conclusion for perceiving. Leibniz imagines entering a perceiving Leibniz imagines entering a perceiving machine, but "never finding anything by machine, but "never finding anything by which to explain a perception." Nothing which to explain a perception." Nothing in its physical makeup or operation would in its physical makeup or operation would enable us to understand perceiving enable us to understand perceiving. . enable us to understand perceiving enable us to understand perceiving. .
Joseph Levine has called this more Joseph Levine has called this more modest claim modest claim the explanatory gap the explanatory gap: : Even Even if perceiving is due to a physical process, if perceiving is due to a physical process, we cannot understand how that could be we cannot understand how that could be (cf. David (cf. David Chalmers's Chalmers's Hard Problem, 1995a , b, 1996 Hard Problem, 1995a Problem, , b, 1996 . .
(cf. David (cf. David Chalmers s Chalmers s Hard Problem, 1995a Problem, , b, 1996 Hard Problem, 1995a Problem, , b, 1996 . . Why would any physical process result Why would any physical process result in a qualitative experience of red in a qualitative experience of red--rather rather than an experience of green? And why than an experience of green? And why would it result in would it result in any any experience at all? experience at all? I'll argue that there is no explanatory I'll argue that there is no explanatory gap, gap, and that the temptation to think there and that the temptation to think there is is rests on certain assumptions that rests on certain assumptions that are not only unwarranted but untrue are not only unwarranted but untrue are not only unwarranted but untrue are not only unwarranted but untrue. . But I'll also raise, and argue against, But I'll also raise, and argue against, some considerations due to Saul some considerations due to Saul Kripke Kripke that are intended to support the that are intended to support the stronger stronger conclusion conclusion-- Just as nothing that one sees inside Just as nothing that one sees inside Leibniz's enlarged machine seems to Leibniz's enlarged machine seems to explain mental qualities, explain mental qualities, so it seems to many that so it seems to many that physicalist physicalist "theories must 'leave out' the "theories must 'leave out' the theories must leave out the theories must leave out the qualitative, conscious side of qualitative, conscious side of mental life" mental life" (Levine 1993 (Levine /1997 ( Levine 1993 Levine /1997 Kripke urges, explain why urges, explain why (2) Pain = the firing of C (2) Pain = the firing of C--fibers. fibers. seems contingent, since seems contingent, since whatever appears to be pain is pain whatever appears to be pain is pain. . "For a sensation to be "For a sensation to be felt felt as pain is for as pain is for it t it t b b i " i " it to it to be be pain" pain" ( (IN IN 163, n. 18; 163, n If If being being pain and pain and appearing appearing to be pain to be pain coincide in this way, coincide in this way, then how a pain feels is "an essential then how a pain feels is "an essential (indeed (indeed necessary and sufficient necessary and sufficient) )
property" of pain property" of pain ( (IN IN 163, n. 18 lack aversive effect. So we might identify such a pain just So we might identify such a pain just So we might identify such a pain just So we might identify such a pain just by its subjective appearance by its subjective appearance--its feel.
its feel. But that feel is arguably But that feel is arguably a symptom of a symptom of a state that in the typical case has the a state that in the typical case has the third third--person properties just mentioned person properties just mentioned. . Another reason to deny that pain is Another reason to deny that pain is essentially as it appears is that some essentially as it appears is that some pains occur pains occur without being conscious without being conscious--and so without there being anything and so without there being anything that that it's like for one it's like for one to have the pain.
to have the pain. p p Consider a headache that, as we say, Consider a headache that, as we say, lasts all day lasts all day--though often during that though often during that period one isn't period one isn't at all at all conscious of it.
conscious of it. Or the slight painful pinch of a shoe of Or the slight painful pinch of a shoe of which one is seldom which one is seldom in any way in any way aware. aware. y y y y
Here there is no conscious feel at all; Here there is no conscious feel at all; it seems subjectively that it seems subjectively that there is no there is no pain pain--no state that no state that seems seems to be a pain.
to be a pain. Appearance and reality thus diverge. Appearance and reality thus diverge.
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Not every pain appears to be pain. Not every pain appears to be pain. But how about the converse? But how about the converse? In so
In so--called called dental fear dental fear, , patients report patients report pain in the drilling of a tooth whose pain in the drilling of a tooth whose nerve is fully anaesthetized or even nerve is fully anaesthetized or even nerve is fully anaesthetized or even nerve is fully anaesthetized or even absent. The standard explanation is absent. The standard explanation is that the patient experiences vibration that the patient experiences vibration and fear, and and fear, and mistakes those for pain mistakes those for pain. . Indeed, our first Indeed, our first--person access to pain person access to pain is itself sometimes erroneous. is itself sometimes erroneous. Pain of a fixed intensity Pain of a fixed intensity introspectively introspectively seems more intense seems more intense when one thinks when one thinks it results from an intention to hurt one it results from an intention to hurt one it results from an intention to hurt one it results from an intention to hurt one than when one doesn't than when one doesn't think that think that Some theorists approach the mind only Some theorists approach the mind only in a first in a first--person way person way (Nagel, Searle) (Nagel, Searle), others , others in just a third in just a third--person way person way (Dennett?) (Dennett?). . But pain occurs without its typical third But pain occurs without its typical third--person concomitants as in pain person concomitants as in pain person concomitants, as in pain person concomitants, as in pain asymbolia asymbolia, and it also occurs without , and it also occurs without its typical first its typical first--person properties.
person properties. The concept of pain is, as Hilary Putnam The concept of pain is, as Hilary Putnam has urged has urged ("Brains and ("Brains and Behaviour Behaviour," 1965, 5) ," 1965, 5), , a cluster concept: a cluster concept: a cluster concept: a cluster concept: It does not rely on one or even several It does not rely on one or even several dispositive criteria, but on a weighted dispositive criteria, but on a weighted collection of many indicators, both first collection of many indicators, both first--and third and third--person in nature.
person in nature. The same arguably holds for all mental The same arguably holds for all mental states, qualitative as well as intentional states, qualitative as well as intentional states. states. Neither first Neither first--nor third nor third--person properties person properties are alone essential to pain are alone essential to pain--are, alone, essential to pain are, alone, essential to pain--nor to mental states generally. nor to mental states generally. So we must guard against accounts So we must guard against accounts that posit either first that posit either first--and third and third--person person properties as being decisive indicators properties as being decisive indicators of pain or other qualitative states at of pain or other qualitative states at of pain or other qualitative states at of pain or other qualitative states at the expense of the other the expense of the other--and we must also and we must also reject any account on reject any account on which first which first--and third and third--person properties person properties don't fit comfortably together don't fit comfortably together. .
These considerations all suggest we These considerations all suggest we must distinguish pain must distinguish pain--as well as other qualitative states as well as other qualitative states--from from our awareness of those states our awareness of those states. .
And that suggests a way to explain why And that suggests a way to explain why And that suggests a way to explain why And that suggests a way to explain why (2) (2) Pain = the firing of C Pain = the firing of C--fibers. fibers.
appears appears to be contingent even if it is to be contingent even if it is in fact necessarily true in fact necessarily true (assuming that 'pain' is a rigid designator) (assuming that 'pain' is a rigid designator). . Seeming Seeming to be pain ≠ pain to be pain ≠ pain Seeming Seeming to be pain ≠ pain.
to be pain ≠ pain. Just as the appearance of water is tied Just as the appearance of water is tied only contingently to H only contingently to H 2 2 O, O, so so the appearance of pain the appearance of pain is tied only is tied only contingently to the firing of C contingently to the firing of C--fibers. fibers. So the pain itself aside, the appearance So the pain itself aside, the appearance of pain seems tied only of pain seems tied only contingently contingently to to its associated neural state its associated neural state. . If so, they're not necessarily identical If so, they're not necessarily identical--so perhaps not identical at all so perhaps not identical at all (Dan (Dan Shargel Shargel, , so perhaps not identical at all so perhaps not identical at all (Dan (Dan Shargel Shargel, , unpublished , to whom thanks for useful conversation) unpublished, to whom thanks for useful conversation). . Still, we have access to this appearance Still, we have access to this appearance of pain, in turn, by our of pain, in turn, by our introspective introspective awareness awareness of how pain appears to us.
of how pain appears to us.
And that suggests a reply. Recall that And that suggests a reply. Recall that when it when it seems seems we imagine pain as we imagine pain as independent of C independent of C--fibers' firing, we're fibers' firing, we're really really imagining imagining the way pain appears the way pain appears to us to us as independent of C as independent of C--fibers' firing.
fibers' firing.
to us to us as independent of C as independent of C fibers firing. fibers firing. So when it seems that we imagine the So when it seems that we imagine the appearance of pain as independent of appearance of pain as independent of its associated neural state, its associated neural state, we're really we're really imagining only our introspecting of that imagining only our introspecting of that appearance without the neural state appearance without the neural state appearance without the neural state appearance without the neural state that's associated with that appearance that's associated with that appearance. . This goes no higher. There is no
This goes no higher. There is no hyper hyper--introspection introspection by which we're aware of by which we're aware of our introspective awareness itself. our introspective awareness itself. This is evident because introspecting This is evident because introspecting does not sometimes seem subjectively does not sometimes seem subjectively j y j y to be conscious and sometimes not. to be conscious and sometimes not. Rather, we're aware of introspecting Rather, we're aware of introspecting indirectly, by inference: We indirectly, by inference: We infer infer we're we're introspecting because we come to be introspecting because we come to be aware not just of our conscious states, aware not just of our conscious states, j , j , but also of our being conscious of them but also of our being conscious of them. .
(Cf. (Cf. Dretske's Dretske's [1994/5, 1999] [1994/5, 1999] If we're inferentially aware of intro If we're inferentially aware of intro--specting specting the subjective appearance of the subjective appearance of pain, we can imagine it without its pain, we can imagine it without its associated neural state. And perhaps if associated neural state. And perhaps if we infer that the inferential awareness we infer that the inferential awareness we infer that the inferential awareness we infer that the inferential awareness occurs, we can go even one step higher. occurs, we can go even one step higher. But we can also just bypass this entire But we can also just bypass this entire sequence. At each step we can imagine sequence. We can seek an epistemic intermediary epistemic intermediary not for 'pain', but for 'firing of C not for 'pain', but for 'firing of C--fibers'. fibers'. not for pain , but for firing of C not for pain , but for firing of C fibers . fibers . Just as water or heat can appear to be Just as water or heat can appear to be present when it isn't, present when it isn't, so the firing of C so the firing of C--fibers can fibers can appear appear to to occur even when it doesn't really occur. occur even when it doesn't really occur. So when it seems that one is imagining So when it seems that one is imagining So when it seems that one is imagining So when it seems that one is imagining pain as independent of C pain as independent of C--fibers' firing, fibers' firing, it can be that one is instead imagining it can be that one is instead imagining only that pain is independent of the only that pain is independent of the appearance appearance of C of C--fibers' firing.
fibers' firing. On the one hand, he urges, "it is … conceivable hand, he urges, "it is … conceivable that there should exist a pain without that there should exist a pain without the firing of C the firing of C--fibers, and the firing of fibers, and the firing of C C--fibers without pain" fibers without pain" (1993/1997, 548) (1993/1997, 548 Descartes held that we're warranted in Descartes held that we're warranted in positing positing unextended unextended substances other substances other than ourselves because we can't explain than ourselves because we can't explain linguistic behavior physiologically linguistic behavior physiologically (to Newcastle, (to Newcastle, AT AT IV 573 IV 573--576, to More, V 275 576, to More, V 275--279; 279; Discourse Discourse VI 58 VI 58 9) 9) Discourse Discourse, , VI 58 VI 58--9) 9). . Similarly, our current vast ignorance of Similarly, our current vast ignorance of neuropsychology may well induce the neuropsychology may well induce the sense that sense that--no matter what we came to no matter what we came to know know--the firing of C the firing of C--fibers could fail to fibers could fail to manifest the property of being pain manifest the property of being pain manifest the property of being pain. manifest the property of being pain. But Descartes was rash: We can now But Descartes was rash: We can now foresee a physiological explanation of foresee a physiological explanation of linguistic behavior. Caution about a full linguistic behavior. Caution about a full account of pain is similarly appropriate. account of pain is similarly appropriate.
But if pain is C But if pain is C--fibers' firing, the rational fibers' firing, the rational tie pain has to neural functioning is no tie pain has to neural functioning is no less than that between water and H less than that between water and H 2 2 O. O.
In In both both cases, the rational tie would cases, the rational tie would stem stem only only from some theory from some theory--chemistry chemistry stem stem only only from some theory from some theory--chemistry chemistry for being water and H for being water and H Two tables! Yes; there are duplicates of every Two tables! Yes; there are duplicates of every object about me object about me--two tables, two chairs, two two tables, two chairs, two pens. … pens. … One of them … is comparatively permanent; One of them … is comparatively permanent; it is it is coloured coloured; above all it is substantial. By ; above all it is substantial. By ; y ; y substantial I do not merely mean that it substantial I do not merely mean that it does not collapse when I lean upon it; I does not collapse when I lean upon it; I mean that it is constituted of "substance" mean that it is constituted of "substance" and by that word I am trying to convey to and by that word I am trying to convey to you some conception of its intrinsic nature. you some conception of its intrinsic nature. It is a thing; not like space, which is a mere It is a thing; not like space, which is a mere negation negation negation. … negation. … There is nothing substantial about my There is nothing substantial about my second table. It is nearly all empty space second table. It is nearly all empty space--space pervaded, it is true, by fields of force, space pervaded, it is true, by fields of force, but these are assigned to the category of but these are assigned to the category of "influences," not of "things" "influences," not of "things" (Introduction) (Introduction). . We dispel the worry not as Levine might We dispel the worry not as Levine might like, by tracing a like, by tracing a theory theory--independent independent rational path from the scientific to the rational path from the scientific to the rational path from the scientific to the rational path from the scientific to the commonsense Levine notes that the explanatory gap Levine notes that the explanatory gap is due to the conceivability of physical is due to the conceivability of physical duplicates of us that have no duplicates of us that have no ( (conscious conscious) ) qualitative states qualitative states (79; cf. (79; cf. Chalmers's Chalmers's "zombies") "zombies"). . Similarly Leibniz's Mill Argument Similarly Leibniz's Mill Argument Similarly, Leibniz s Mill Argument Similarly, Leibniz s Mill Argument purports to show that whatever purports to show that whatever machinery may operate within us, machinery may operate within us, we can conceive of it as not resulting in we can conceive of it as not resulting in perceiving perceiving--whether conscious or not.
whether conscious or not. In my closing section I'll argue that this In my closing section I'll argue that this In my closing section, I ll argue that this In my closing section, I ll argue that this apparent conceivability apparent conceivability is due to a is due to a mistake in how theorists often think mistake in how theorists often think about qualitative character about qualitative character--as being as being essentially or necessarily conscious. essentially or necessarily conscious.
IV. A Theory of IV. A Theory of Mental Qualities Mental Qualities
Descartes saw all mental phenomena Descartes saw all mental phenomena Descartes saw all mental phenomena Descartes saw all mental phenomena as cases of as cases of conscious thinking conscious thinking, , and all physical, bodily phenomena as and all physical, bodily phenomena as inhering in a substance whose only inhering in a substance whose only essential property is essential property is extension extension. .
These disparate characterizations make These disparate characterizations make it seem at best mysterious how mental it seem at best mysterious how mental it seem at best mysterious how mental it seem at best mysterious how mental phenomena could be physical. phenomena could be physical. Few if any accept those ideas today. Few if any accept those ideas today. But something similar is at work in much But something similar is at work in much current thinking about mental qualities. current thinking about mental qualities. Just as the distance between conscious Just as the distance between conscious thinking and pure extension may seem thinking and pure extension may seem too great to bridge rationally, too great to bridge rationally, so too for so too for the intuitive distance between the intuitive distance between neural functioning and conscious neural functioning and conscious neural functioning and conscious neural functioning and conscious qualitative character qualitative character. . But we needn't go straight from neural But we needn't go straight from neural functioning to functioning to conscious conscious qualitative qualitative character. character. Pains Pains--and qualitative states generally and qualitative states generally--Pains Pains--and qualitative states generally and qualitative states generally--need not be conscious. So we can go need not be conscious. So we can go from neural functioning to from neural functioning to nonconscious nonconscious qualitative character, and from there to qualitative character, and from there to conscious conscious mental qualities. mental qualities.
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For this to work, we need For this to work, we need two things two things: :
1. An account of mental qualities 1. An account of mental qualities that's that's independent independent of those of those qualities' being conscious. qualities' being conscious. And we also need: And we also need: And we also need: And we also need:
2. An account of what
2. An account of what additional additional factor factor results in mental qualities' results in mental qualities' sometimes being conscious. sometimes being conscious. The two accounts
The two accounts must fit together must fit together. .
And together they must allow for a And together they must allow for a And together they must allow for a And together they must allow for a credible credible theoretical bridge theoretical bridge from neural from neural functioning to the relevant mental functioning to the relevant mental phenomenon phenomenon--thereby enabling us to thereby enabling us to cross the intuitive explanatory gap. cross the intuitive explanatory gap. Perceiving requires discriminating Perceiving requires discriminating among perceptible properties among perceptible properties--properties an individual can perceive. properties an individual can perceive. And to do that, the individual must be And to do that, the individual must be able to be in able to be in states that resemble and states that resemble and able to be in able to be in states that resemble and states that resemble and differ among themselves in ways that differ among themselves in ways that are are homomorphic homomorphic to the perceptible to the perceptible similarities and differences among the similarities and differences among the relevant objective properties relevant objective properties. .
The relevant similarities and differences The relevant similarities and differences The relevant similarities and differences The relevant similarities and differences among perceptible properties are among perceptible properties are those perceptible by the individual those perceptible by the individual--not as described, e.g., by psychophysics not as described, e.g., by psychophysics or by physical theory. or by physical theory. give give an account of mental qualities that's an account of mental qualities that's independent of their being conscious independent of their being conscious (Rosenthal (Rosenthal Consciousness and Mind Consciousness and Mind chs chs 5 5--7 esp 7) 7 esp 7) (Rosenthal, (Rosenthal, Consciousness and Mind Consciousness and Mind, , chs chs. 5 . 5--7, esp. 7) 7, esp. 7). . The technique also explains the spatial The technique also explains the spatial aspects of mental qualities aspects of mental qualities (Douglas B. (Douglas B. Meehan, 2001 , 2002 , unpublished) Meehan, 2001 , 2002 , as well as , as well as qualities that figure in bodily sensations. qualities that figure in bodily sensations. One must be aware of the state in a One must be aware of the state in a way that's subjectively unmediated and way that's subjectively unmediated and subjectively "from the inside" subjectively "from the inside"--i.e., independent of any inference or i.e., independent of any inference or observation observation of which one is aware of which one is aware. . observation observation of which one is aware of which one is aware. .
And one must also be aware of the And one must also be aware of the qualitative state qualitative state as such as such--i.e., in i.e., in respect of the relevant mental quality. respect of the relevant mental quality. That means being aware of oneself as That means being aware of oneself as being in a state whose being in a state whose location in its location in its being in a state whose being in a state whose location in its location in its quality space quality space corresponds to the corresponds to the loca loca--tion tion of the target perceptible property in of the target perceptible property in the quality space of properties accessible the quality space of properties accessible by the relevant sensory modality. by the relevant sensory modality.
This higher This higher--order awareness (HOA) order awareness (HOA) results in the target qualitative state's results in the target qualitative state's being conscious because a state's being being conscious because a state's being conscious conscious consists consists in in its being a state one is, in the specified its being a state one is, in the specified its being a state one is, in the specified its being a state one is, in the specified way, aware of oneself as being in. way, aware of oneself as being in. order thought. But any mental implementation on But any mental implementation on which the HOA is independent of the which the HOA is independent of the target state will serve to avoid the target state will serve to avoid the intuitive explanatory gap. intuitive explanatory gap. We're far more likely to be conscious of conscious of two slightly different mental qualities as two slightly different mental qualities as distinct distinct when they occur together than when they occur together than one after the other one after the other (see, e.g., (see, e.g., Raffman Raffman, 1995) , 1995). .
But if consciousness were But if consciousness were intrinsic intrinsic to to the qualitative states, the qualitative states, it wouldn't matter whether they occur it wouldn't matter whether they occur together or in succession. together or in succession. The best explanation of this striking The best explanation of this striking The best explanation of this striking The best explanation of this striking disparity is the two disparity is the two--stage theory stage theory--on which on which we're conscious of mental we're conscious of mental qualities in respect of their location qualities in respect of their location in the relevant quality space in the relevant quality space. .
We're conscious of finer differences We're conscious of finer differences We re conscious of finer differences We re conscious of finer differences among simultaneous qualities because among simultaneous qualities because we can locate them we can locate them comparatively comparatively within within their quality space, which is a lot harder their quality space, which is a lot harder when the qualities don't occur together. when the qualities don't occur together. If consciousness were If consciousness were intrinsically tied intrinsically tied to mental qualities to mental qualities, , 1 1 st st --person access to person access to them would trump 3 them would trump 3 rd rd --person access.
person access. And since my mental qualities aren't And since my mental qualities aren't conscious for you mine might as far conscious for you mine might as far conscious for you, mine might, as far conscious for you, mine might, as far as you can know, be inverted relative as you can know, be inverted relative to yours or even absent altogether to yours or even absent altogether--which which the two the two--stage theory blocks stage theory blocks. .
If quality inversion and absence were If quality inversion and absence were conceivable conceivable mental qualities would mental qualities would conceivable, conceivable, mental qualities would mental qualities would seem independent of seem independent of nonmental nonmental reality reality, , which would not only suggest an which would not only suggest an explanatory gap, but also preclude an explanatory gap, but also preclude an informative informative account of mental quality.
account of mental quality. I've argued that mental qualities do not I've argued that mental qualities do not by themselves yield an explanatory gap, by themselves yield an explanatory gap, since we can give an informative theory since we can give an informative theory of those qualities that's of those qualities that's independent of independent of their being conscious their being conscious. . their being conscious their being conscious. . But Leibniz had no such theory. But Leibniz had no such theory. So he had So he had no way to think about mental no way to think about mental qualities qualities--whether conscious or not whether conscious or not--except by reference to how we access except by reference to how we access those qualities in a distinctively first those qualities in a distinctively first--those qualities in a distinctively first those qualities in a distinctively first person way person way when they are conscious when they are conscious. .
And thinking of them
And thinking of them solely solely in that first in that first--person way makes it hard to see how person way makes it hard to see how there can be any rational explanation. there can be any rational explanation. 
